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PREVENTING INEQUITY: 
EXTENDING ISSUE PRECLUSION TO CLAIM 
CONSTRUCTION DURING REEXAMINATION 
OF PREVIOUSLY LITIGATED PATENTS 
Lauren Drake* 
This Note explores the uncertainty and inequity created through the 
dichotomy approach to claim interpretation in the context of 
reexamination of previously litigated patents. To address this 
uncertainty and inequity, this Note argues that the claim interpretation 
determined in a Markman hearing should be binding on the U.S. Patent 
& Trademark Office (PTO) during reexamination of a previously 
litigated patent as a form of issue preclusion. To accomplish this result, 
this Note proposes three changes to current patent practice: first, the 
definition of “party” must be expanded to include the PTO; second, the 
PTO must abandon the broadest reasonable interpretation standard of 
claim interpretation when reexamining previously litigated patents; and 
third, Article III courts must deny motions to stay for the purpose of 
reexaminations. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Current patent practice employs differing methods of claim 
interpretation during patent prosecution and post-issuance review in 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and during litigation in 
Article III courts. The PTO interprets claims under the broadest 
reasonable interpretation standard,1 while Article III courts hold 
Markman2 hearings. The resulting inconsistency allows an alleged 
infringer to file a motion to stay and initiate a reexamination 
proceeding when a Markman hearing results in a harmful claim 
interpretation,3 essentially giving the alleged infringer two bites at 
the apple. The uncertainty and inequity created through this process 
impedes the fundamental goal of the patent system—to provide 
incentives for creators to invent and publicly disclose their 
inventions.4 This Note will argue that the claim interpretation 
determined in a Markman hearing should be binding on the PTO 
during reexamination of a previously litigated patent as a form of 
issue preclusion. To accomplish this, three changes to current patent 
practice must be made. First, the definition of ―party‖ must be 
expanded to include the PTO, so that issue preclusion may apply. 
Second, the PTO must abandon the broadest reasonable 
interpretation standard of claim interpretation when reexamining 
previously litigated patents. Third, Article III courts must deny 
motions to stay for the purpose of reexaminations, so that the 
Markman claim interpretation is final before reexamination 
concludes.5  
 
 1. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP‘T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2111, at 2100-37 (8th ed., 6th rev. 2007) [hereinafter M.P.E.P.]. 
 2. A Markman hearing is a proceeding to determine the meaning of the claims. Markman v. 
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 3. See In re Trans Tex. Holdings Corp., 498 F.3d 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2007); ROBERT 
GREENE STERNE ET AL., REEXAMININATION PRACTICE WITH CONCURRENT DISTRICT COURT OR 
USITC PATENT LITIGATION 13 (The Sedona Conference 2008) [hereinafter CONCURRENT 
LITIGATION]; Tony Dutra, Patentee Challenges PTO‟s Ongoing Reexam After Court‟s „Final 
Decision‟ on Validity, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., Dec. 19, 2008, at 194. 
 4. Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal (Un)Certainty, Legal Process, and Patent Law, 43 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1109, 1112 (2010). 
 5. While the suggested changes could be implemented through amending the Patent Act, 
this Note assumes that the Federal Circuit would implement the proposals. 
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II.  STATEMENT OF EXISTING LAW 
A.  Determining Patentability 
Patents protect ―new, unobvious, and useful inventions‖6 that 
take the form of a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter.7 In order to obtain a patent, an inventor must file an 
application with the PTO that includes ―a specification describing 
and precisely claiming the invention.‖8 Following its submission to 
the PTO, the application is assigned to an examiner who conducts a 
search of the prior art9 and determines if the invention complies with 
the legal requirements of patentability.10 If the examiner determines 
that the application satisfies the legal requirements of patentability, 
he or she will allow the claim or claims11 and issue a patent.12 Upon 
issuance, the patent confers on the patent owner the right to exclude 
others from making, using, or selling the claimed invention in the 
United States for a period of twenty years from the application filing 
date.13 
 
 6. 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS OV-1 (2010). 
 7. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (―Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, 
may obtain a patent thereof, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.‖). 
 8. 1 CHISUM, supra note 6, at OV-1. 
9.The prior art constitutes those references which may be used to determine the 
novelty and nonobviousness of claimed subject matter in a patent application or patent. 
It includes both documentary sources (patents and publications from anywhere in the 
world) and nondocumentary sources (things known, used or invented in the United 
States). A reference must be in the art pertinent to the invention in question or in an 
analogous art. A reference must be dated prior to the applicant‘s date of invention or, 
in the case of statutory bars, more than one year prior to his date of application for a 
patent.  
Id. at Gl-18. 
 10. The legal requirements of patentability are ―novelty, utility, nonobviousness, enabling 
disclosure, and clear claiming.‖ Id. at OV-1. 
 11. Id. at OV-1–OV-2.  
 12. Id. at OV-2. 
 13. See id.; id. § 16.01 (―A patent extends for a term of (1) in the case of patents (except 
design patents) based on applications filed before June 8, 1995, (a) seventeen years measured 
from the date the patent issues or (b) twenty years measured from the earliest referenced 
application filing date, whichever is greater, and (2) in the case of patents based on applications 
filed on or after June 8, 1995, twenty years measured from the earliest referenced application 
filing date.‖). 
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B.  Reexamination14 Proceedings Within the PTO 
Following issuance, the PTO loses its plenary jurisdiction to 
determine patentability but maintains the authority to reexamine 
patents on prescribed grounds.15 The director of the PTO, the patent 
owner, or any other person may initiate a patent reexamination by 
citing prior art (in the form of patents or printed publications) and 
requesting that the PTO reexamine the patent claims on the basis of 
the cited prior art.16 If the director determines that the cited prior art 
raises a substantial new question of patentability,17 a reexamination 
proceeding is initiated and the claims in question are examined 
according to the initial examination procedures.18 Upon conclusion of 
the reexamination proceeding, the director issues a certificate 
canceling any claims determined to be unpatentable and confirming 
any claims determined to be patentable.19 
C.  Patent Litigation 
Article III courts have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over 
all cases arising under patent law.20 The rights conferred by a patent 
can be enforced in an Article III court by anyone with an entire 
ownership interest in the patent.21 Similarly, a party may seek a 
 
 14. There are two varieties of reexamination—ex parte reexamination and optional inter 
partes reexamination. Id. § 11.07[4], at 11-711. The primary distinctions between the two 
varieties are that optional inter partes reexamination is only available for patents filed on or after 
November 29, 1999, and provides expanded rights for a third party requestor. Id. § 11.07[4](g), at 
11-843–11-850. For the purposes of this Note, ―ex parte reexamination‖ and ―inter partes 
reexamination‖ will be referred to generally as ―reexamination.‖ 
 15. Id. § 11.07. 
 16. Id. § 11.07[4]. 
 17. A prior art patent or printed publication raises a substantial question of patentability 
where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider the 
prior art patent or printed publication important in deciding whether or not the claim is 
patentable. If the prior art patents and/or publications would be considered important, 
then the examiner should find ―a substantial new question of patentability‖ unless the 
same question of patentability has already been decided as to the claim in a final 
holding of invalidity by the Federal court system or by the Office in a previous 
examination. For example, the same question of patentability may have already been 
decided by the Office where the examiner finds the additional (newly provided) prior 
art patents or printed publications are merely cumulative to similar prior art already 
fully considered by the Office in a previous examination of the claim. 
M.P.E.P., supra note 1, § 2242, at 2200-53. 
 18. 4 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 11.07[4] (2005). 
 19. Id. 
 20. HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 45 (4th ed. 2003). 
 21. Id. at 41. 
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declaratory judgment that a patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not 
infringed.22 
During patent litigation, a patent is presumed valid.23 Therefore, 
the burden rests on the challenger to demonstrate by clear and 
convincing evidence that the patent is invalid.24 Given the 
presumption of validity, the court is not asked in an infringement suit 
to hold a patent valid, but instead to determine whether the patent is 
invalid.25 
Courts find infringement where ―someone (1) without authority 
(2) makes, uses, offers to sell, sells, or imports (3) the patented 
invention (4) within the United States, its territories, or its 
possessions (5) during the term of the patent.‖26 Where the above 
elements are satisfied, the alleged infringer may defend by arguing 
that the patent is invalid; an invalid patent cannot be infringed.27 
Absent a showing that the patent is invalid, if the elements of 
infringement are satisfied, the patent owner is entitled to a remedy in 
the form of an injunction or monetary damages.28 
The third element of infringement—―the patented invention‖—
demonstrates the importance of claim construction. As the claims of 
a patent define what the invention is, claim construction is the first 
step in determining whether ―the patented invention‖ has been 
infringed.29 
D.  Patent Claims 
As discussed previously, a patent application must include a 
specification describing and precisely claiming the invention.30 The 
 
 22. Id. at 43–45; see also MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 126–27 (2007) 
(discussing the procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment action in federal court). 
 23. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006); SCHWARTZ, supra note 20, at 52. 
 24. SCHWARTZ, supra note 20, at 52 (citing Oakley, Inc. v. Sunglass Hut Int‘l, 316 F.3d 
1331, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003)) (other citations omitted). A patent will be held invalid if the alleged 
infringer demonstrates ―that the patented invention does not meet one or more of the conditions 
of patentability‖ or ―that the inventor did not satisfy one or more of the requirements of 
patentability.‖ Id. at 174. 
 25. Id. at 52–53 (citing Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 
1983)). 
 26. Id. at 151–52 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271). 
 27. Id. at 174. 
 28. Id. at 191–92. 
 29. Id. at 158–59. 
 30. See supra Part II.A. 
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issued patent contains the complete specification.31 The specification 
must include ―one or more claims particularly pointing out and 
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as 
his invention.‖32 The purpose of the claim is to ―mak[e] the patentee 
define precisely what his invention is.‖33 As such, the claims of the 
patent define the invention in order to determine initial patentability 
and infringement.34 As the patent claims define the scope of the 
invention, a court must construe the claims during litigation in order 
to determine infringement and validity, and the PTO must construe 
the claims during examination or reexamination in order to 
determine patentability.35 
E.  PTO Claim Construction During  
Patent Prosecution and Reexamination 
During patent prosecution before the PTO, claims in a pending 
patent application are given their ―broadest reasonable interpretation 
consistent with the specification,‖36 as ―it would be interpreted by 
one of ordinary skill in the art.‖37 Following this guideline, if the 
―specification provide[s] a sufficiently precise definition for a term, 
the inquiry should end right there.‖38 An examiner applies the same 
broadest reasonable interpretation standard during a reexamination 
 
 31. 1 CHISUM, supra note 6, § OV-2. 
 32. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); 3 CHISUM, supra note 6, § 8.01. 
 33. White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 52 (1886). 
 34. 3 CHISUM, supra note 6, § 8.01. 
 35. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510 (1917) (―The 
scope of every patent is limited to the invention described in the claims contained in it, read in the 
light of the specification. These so mark where the progress claimed by the patent begins and 
where it ends that they have been aptly likened to the description in a deed, which sets the bounds 
to the grant which it contains. It is to the claims of every patent, therefore, that (the courts) must 
turn when . . . seeking to determine what the invention is, the exclusive use of which is given to 
the inventor by the grant provided for by the statute,—‗He can claim nothing beyond them.‘‖) 
(citing Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phx. Iron Co., 95 U.S. 274, 278 (1877); R.R. Co. v. Mellon, 104 
U.S. 112, 118 (1881); Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Greenleaf, 117 U.S. 554, 559 (1886); McClain v. 
Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891))); 3 CHISUM, supra note 6, § 8.01. 
 36. M.P.E.P., supra note 1, § 2111, at 2100-37; Joel Miller, Claim Construction at the 
PTO—The “Broadest Reasonable Interpretation. . .”, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC‘Y 279, 
281 (2006) (citing In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 37. In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Miller, supra note 36, at 287. 
 38. Miller, supra note 36, at 282 (citing Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 
F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
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proceeding.39 In fact, the same rule of construction applies when a 
patent applicant whose claim has been twice rejected, when a patent 
owner whose claim has received a final rejection in a reexamination 
proceeding, and when a third party whose claim has received a final 
decision in an inter partes proceeding appeals to the Board of Patent 
Appeals and Interferences (―the Board‖).40 If the applicant or third 
party is unsatisfied with the Board‘s decision on appeal the Federal 
Circuit will review the construction de novo applying the same 
broadest reasonable interpretation standard.41 Thus, throughout 
prosecution and reexamination, the claims will be ―given their 
‗broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification‘ 
and ‗consistent with the one that those skilled in the art would 
reach.‘‖42 
F.  Claim Construction During Patent Litigation 
The Markman Court established that claim interpretation, or the 
determination ―of what the words in the claim mean,‖43 is ―a question 
of law, to be determined by the court.‖44 As such, during a Markman 
hearing, ―courts must resolve every dispute over the scope of the 
patent claims as a matter of claim construction, issuing a written 
ruling that ‗interprets‘ even simple patent claim terms that jurors can 
understand.‖45 During a Markman hearing, courts construe claims by 
starting with the plain meaning of the terms as a person having 
 
 39. Miller, supra note 36, at 279 n.1 (citing In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 
1984)). 
 40. 35 U.S.C. § 134 (2006); see In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (―[T]he Board is required to use a different standard for construing claims than 
that used by district courts. We have held that it is error for the Board to ‗appl[y] the mode of 
claim interpretation that is used by courts in litigation, when interpreting the claims of issued 
patents in connection with determinations of infringement and validity.‘‖ (quoting In re Zletz, 
893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989)) (second alteration in original)); see, e.g., Miller, supra note 
36, at 291. 
 41. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
 42. Miller, supra note 36, at 291 (citations omitted). 
 43. Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 374 (1996) (quoting HERBERT 
SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 80 (2d ed. 1995)) (original quotation marks omitted). 
 44. Id. at 384 (quoting Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 338 (1854)) (original 
quotation marks omitted). 
 45. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim 
Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1751 (2009) (citing O2 Micro Int‘l Ltd. v. Beyond 
Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360–62 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (emphasis in original). 
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ordinary skill in the art would understand them.46 In addition, the 
Federal Circuit has set forth legal canons of claim interpretation47 
directing that the court may look at the patent‘s specification and its 
prosecution history, as well as technical treatises, dictionaries, and 
expert testimony.48 Finally, where there is ambiguity as to the claim‘s 
meaning, the courts construe the claim narrowly rather than 
broadly.49 Essentially, the court in a Markman hearing attempts to get 
the claim interpretation ―correct,‖50 which often results in a narrower 
construction than would occur under the PTO‘s broadest reasonable 
interpretation standard.51 
G.  Reexamination and Litigation  
Practice Including Litigation Stays 
The Patent Act states, ―Any person at any time may file a 
request for reexamination by the [PTO] of any claim of a patent on 
the basis of any prior art . . . .‖52 As the statute indicates, ―[a]ny 
person‖ may make a request for reexamination at ―any time,‖ 
including when the patent for which reexamination is requested is 
involved in a concurrent litigation proceeding.53 
When someone files a reexamination request for a patent 
involved in concurrent litigation, a party to the litigation may request 
a litigation stay.54 In determining whether to grant a litigation stay 
under these circumstances, courts generally look to three factors: ―(1) 
 
 46. Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
101, 101–02 (2005). 
 47. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313–24 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (setting forth 
the types of evidence a court may consider during claim construction). 
 48. Burk & Lemley, supra note 45, at 1750. 
 49. Athletic Alts., Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating that 
when there is an equal choice between a broader and narrower meaning, the notice function of the 
claim is best served by adopting the narrower claim meaning); Burk & Lemley, supra note 45, at 
1790. 
 50. CONCURRENT LITIGATION, supra note 3, at 19–20. 
 51. Id. 
 52. 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2006). The term ―any prior art‖ in the statute was later limited by 37 
C.F.R. 1.510(b)(1), which limits prior art that may raise a substantial new question of 
patentability to prior patents and printed publications. 
 53. M.P.E.P., supra note 1, § 2286. 
 54. 35 U.S.C. § 318; Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1426–27 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(citations omitted) (―Courts have inherent power to manage their dockets and stay proceedings, 
including the authority to order a stay pending conclusion of a PTO reexamination.‖); see 
CONCURRENT LITIGATION, supra note 3, at 13. 
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whether a stay will unduly prejudice or present a clear tactical 
disadvantage to the nonmoving party; (2) whether a stay will 
simplify the issues in question and trial of the case; and (3) whether 
discovery is complete and whether a trial date has been set.‖55 If the 
preceding factors weigh in favor of a stay, the court may grant a 
litigation stay pending the conclusion of the reexamination 
proceeding.56 In contrast, the PTO has no authority to stay a patent 
reexamination proceeding pending the outcome of a concurrent 
litigation proceeding.57 
H.  The Current Relationship Between the  
PTO and Article III Courts 
Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, operates such that 
―[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined 
by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to 
the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action 
between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.‖58 
Currently, issue preclusion does not prevent a patent claim from 
being interpreted once by an Article III court in a Markman hearing 
and then again by the PTO during a subsequent or concurrent 
reexamination proceeding, as the PTO would not have been a party 
to the Markman hearing and would therefore not be bound by that 
proceeding‘s order.59 Since issue preclusion does not currently act as 
a bar to subsequent claim interpretation, the question then becomes 
whether an Article III court holding has any effect on a subsequent 
reexamination proceeding. 
As discussed above, during a reexamination proceeding, claims 
are construed under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, 
while a narrower standard is usually adopted in a Markman hearing. 
Given these differing standards, a Markman hearing‘s claim 
 
 55. CONCURRENT LITIGATION, supra note 3, at 13 (quoting Soverain Software, L.L.C. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 660, 662 (E.D. Tex. 2005). 
 56. Ethicon, 849 F.2d at 1426–27. 
 57. Id. at 1427 (reasoning that the PTO lacked the authority to stay reexaminations pending 
the conclusion of litigation on the basis that Congress commands the PTO to conduct 
reexaminations with special dispatch, and makes no mention of stays). 
 58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). 
 59. In a reexamination proceeding, the parties to the dispute are the patent owner and the 
PTO, where in a litigation proceeding the parties to the dispute are the patent owner and the party 
arguing against patent validity. See In re Trans Tex. Holdings Corp., 498 F.3d 1290, 1298 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007). 
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interpretation does not have preclusive effect on the PTO‘s claim 
construction in a subsequent reexamination proceeding.60 In fact, 
current practice dictates that the PTO—after construing claims using 
the broadest reasonable interpretation standard—can invalidate a 
patent claim that an Article III court previously held was not invalid 
over the same prior art.61 However, a final holding of claim invalidity 
is binding on the PTO in a subsequent reexamination proceeding.62 
What is troubling about this scenario is not that a claim that an 
Article III court held was not invalid can later be held invalid in a 
reexamination proceeding—in fact, this corresponds with the PTO 
policy of continually ensuring patents‘ validity—but that the PTO 
and Article III courts may, and likely will, interpret a patent claim 
differently. Thus, even while a patent owner is forced to argue for the 
validity of a broad claim before the PTO, he can only enforce the 
narrow claim interpretation determined by an Article III court.63 
If, during a reexamination proceeding, substantive amendments 
are made to a patent‘s claims, past damage awards for infringement 
may be defeated under the doctrine of intervening rights.64 Similarly, 
if the patent claims for which damages were assessed are held 
invalid, past damage awards may be canceled.65 
III.  CRITIQUE OF EXISTING LAW 
A.  Dichotomy Approach to Claim Interpretation  
Reaches an Inequitable Result 
To implement a form of issue preclusion in patent claim 
interpretation, the PTO must abandon the broadest reasonable 
interpretation standard in the limited context of reexamination 
 
 60. CONCURRENT LITIGATION, supra note 3, at 19. 
 61. Id. at 20. See generally In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that a 
prior judgment by an Article III court upholding the validity of a claim was not a bar to the PTO, 
as an executive agency, from finding a substantial new question of patentability regarding an 
issue that had not previously been considered by the PTO). 
 62. However, a non-final holding of invalidity is not binding on the PTO. CONCURRENT 
LITIGATION, supra note 3, at 20. 
 63. See Dawn-Marie Bey & Christopher A. Cotropia, The Unreasonableness of the Patent 
Office‟s “Broadest Reasonable Interpretation” Standard, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 285, 295–96 (2009). 
 64. CONCURRENT LITIGATION, supra note 3, at 15 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 252, 307(b), 316(b) 
(2006)). 
 65. See Translogic Tech., Inc. v. Hitachi, Ltd., 250 F. App‘x 988 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(unpublished decision). 
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proceedings of patents that have previously been interpreted during a 
Markman hearing. 
The dichotomy approach to claim interpretation ―necessarily 
means that the scope of a claim . . . at issuance [could be different] 
from the scope determined during enforcement, which would 
establish different ‗inventions‘ for the same claim.‖66 As stated 
above, this creates a situation in which a patent applicant, throughout 
prosecution, must avoid subject matter that will not later be 
considered infringing subject matter in an enforcement proceeding.67 
Simply put, it seems inappropriate for a patent owner to patent a 
broad invention but only be able to enforce a narrow invention.68 
The Federal Circuit‘s decision in In re Trans Texas Holdings 
Corp.69 (Trans Texas) highlighted this problem. In Trans Texas, the 
district court‘s Markman hearing construed ―‗responsive to the rate 
of inflation‘ to mean ‗directly responsive to a market indicator of 
prior actual inflation and is not meant to include the market‘s 
expectation of future inflation,‘‖ thereby requiring a ―continuous, 
one-to-one correlation with inflation rate.‖70 At the conclusion of 
claim construction, the parties reached a settlement, at which point 
Trans Texas filed a request for reexamination.71 In the subsequent 
reexamination proceeding, the PTO found, under the broadest 
reasonable interpretation standard, that ―the term ‗responsive to the 
rate of inflation‘ (and related terms) [was] not limited to a 
continuous, one-to-one relationship but also includes a delayed 
relationship, in which adjustments are made in 1 percent 
increments.‖72 Under the PTO‘s claim interpretation, Trans Texas‘s 
claims were held obvious over prior art.73 Despite Trans Texas‘s 
argument that the district court‘s claim interpretation bound the 
PTO,74 the Federal Circuit held that this outcome was appropriate as 
issue preclusion was not applicable since the PTO had not been a 
 
 66. Bey & Cotropia, supra note 63, at 295–96 (arguing for the abandonment of the ―broadest 
reasonable interpretation‖ standard throughout patent prosecution and enforcement). 
 67. Id. at 306. 
 68. See id. at 303–04; In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 69. In re Trans Tex. Holdings Corp., 498 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 70. Id. at 1296 (citations omitted). 
 71. Id. at 1294–95. 
 72. Id. at 1299. 
 73. See id. 
 74. Id. at 1294. 
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party to the earlier action.75 Therefore, the PTO—and the Board 
when the PTO‘s decision was appealed—was not bound by the 
district court‘s claim construction.76 
Similarly, the Federal Circuit held that an invalidity 
determination in a reexamination proceeding trumped a district 
court‘s finding of validity when both were simultaneously available 
for appeal.77 In In re Translogic Technology, Inc.78 (Translogic), the 
district court entered a final judgment against Hitachi for infringing 
Translogic‘s patent.79 Prior to the district court‘s judgment, Hitachi 
filed a request for reexamination of Translogic‘s patent.80 Upon 
reexamination, the PTO rejected Translogic‘s claims because they 
were obvious at the time of invention.81 Absent a valid patent, 
Hitachi could not be held liable for infringement; accordingly, the 
Federal Circuit vacated the district court‘s decision and remanded the 
case for dismissal.82 
Trans Texas83 and Translogic84 illuminate the horizontal inequity 
that the dichotomy approach to claim interpretation creates.85 The 
PTO‘s application of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard 
creates a scenario where ―[t]he same claims have different meanings 
depending on the venue of the court interpreting them.‖86 Essentially, 
this inequity creates two different inventions—one that the patent 
holder must argue is valid and one that the patent holder is entitled to 
enforce.87 
 
 75. Id. at 1297. 
 76. Id. at 1301 (―We conclude that the Board was not bound by the district court‘s claim 
construction and properly construed the term ‗responsive to the rate of inflation‘ and related 
terms.‖). 
 77. Dutra, supra note 3, at 195; see In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1251 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007). 
 78. 504 F.3d 1249. 
 79. Translogic Tech., Inc. v. Hitachi, Ltd., 250 F. App‘x 988, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(unpublished decision). 
 80. In re Translogic Tech., 504 F.3d at 1251. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Translogic Tech., 250 F. App‘x at 988. 
 83. In re Trans Tex. Holdings Corp., 498 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 84. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 85. See Bey & Cotropia, supra note 63, at 312. 
 86. Id.  
 87. See id. at 311–12. 
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B.  The Broadest Reasonable Interpretation Standard  
Is Fundamentally Flawed 
In addition to the inequity created by the dichotomy approach to 
claim interpretation, the broadest reasonable interpretation standard 
is itself flawed. The standard has traditionally been justified on the 
basis that ―[g]iving claims their broadest reasonable construction 
‗serves the public interest by reducing the possibility that claims, 
finally allowed, will be given broader scope than is justified.‘‖88 
Essentially, the standard prevents a false finding of patentability 
based on a narrow claim interpretation when later litigation may 
result in a broader claim interpretation that is not patentable based on 
the prior art.89 This justification does not apply in the limited context 
of reexamination of a claim previously construed during a Markman 
hearing, as the infringed claim‘s patentability was previously 
determined under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard. 
Additionally, the broadest reasonable interpretation standard has 
been justified on the basis that claims may be amended during 
prosecution and reexamination.90 Thus, an applicant dissatisfied with 
the PTO‘s broad interpretation may correct the interpretation by 
amending the claim‘s language.91 Finally, the broadest reasonable 
interpretation standard has been justified on the basis that patent 
applications—unlike issued patents—do not enjoy a presumption of 
validity.92 Upon rejection of a patent claim by the PTO, an applicant 
must demonstrate patentability by clarifying the claim meaning.93 In 
doing so, a prosecution history is created that more clearly places the 
public on notice of the patented invention‘s scope.94
 
Despite its justifications the broadest reasonable interpretation 
standard is fundamentally flawed.95 In applying the broadest 
reasonable interpretation standard, ―[t]he PTO doesn‘t engage in 
claim construction‖;96
 
therefore, examiners avoid tough claim 
 
 88. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting In re 
Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984)); Bey & Cotropia, supra note 63, at 291. 
 89. See Bey & Cotropia, supra note 63, at 291–92. 
 90. Id. at 292–93. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 293. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 294. 
 96. Lemley, supra note 46, at 117. 
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interpretation issues by only requiring the adoption of ―reasonable‖ 
claim interpretations instead of ―correct‖ claim interpretations.97 This 
in turn robs the public of a prosecution history that contains 
discussions of claim meaning, which could be used during 
litigation.98 The confusion resulting from the broadest reasonable 
interpretation standard is furthered by the lack of any metric to 
determine whether a resulting interpretation under the standard is in 
fact reasonable.99 These issues lead to the conclusion that the 
broadest reasonable interpretation standard itself is flawed and 
should therefore be eliminated, not only when reexamining 
previously litigated patents but perhaps entirely.100 
IV.  PROPOSAL 
A.  Necessary Changes to Extend Issue Preclusion 
To address the inequities of the dichotomy approach to claim 
interpretation and the practice of allowing an infringer two 
opportunities to invalidate an infringed patent, I propose that—as a 
form of issue preclusion—the Markman hearing claim interpretation 
should be binding on the PTO during reexamination of a previously 
litigated patent. For this to happen, three changes to current patent 
practice must occur. First, the Federal Circuit must overrule Trans 
Texas101 and expand the term ―party‖ to include the PTO102 (which 
 
 97. Bey & Cotropia, supra note 63, at 300. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 318. 
 100. See generally id. (arguing for the elimination of the broadest reasonable interpretation 
standard on the basis that (1) it is inconsistent with patent statutes; (2) it is contrary to the unitary 
appellate structure of the patent system; (3) it allows examiners and the Federal Circuit to skirt 
tough claim interpretation issues; (4) it results in improper denial of patent protection; (5) it 
forces costly amending of patent claims; and (6) it is fatally ambiguous). 
 101. In re Trans Tex. Holdings Corp., 498 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 102. The Federal Circuit in Trans Texas, in declining to apply issue preclusion to the PTO as 
a non-party to the first action, noted that doing so in the case of an individual may violate the Due 
Process Clause. ―In fact, the Supreme Court has specifically held that ‗litigants . . . who never 
appeared in a prior action[] may not be collaterally estopped without litigating the issue. . . . Due 
process prohibits estopping them despite one or more existing adjudications of the identical issue 
which stand squarely against their position.‘‖ Id. at 1297 (quoting Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. 
Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971)). The Federal Circuit then noted that while the 
protections of the Due Process Clause do not apply to the government, ―the procedural 
protections afforded to private parties in the res judicata and collateral estoppel context also apply 
to the government.‖ Id. at 1297 n.6; see United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 170 
(1984). My proposal assumes that the Supreme Court could extend the doctrine of privity to 
 
766 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:751 
essentially acts as the representative of the individual who filed the 
reexamination request and was a party to the litigation), such that 
issue preclusion may apply to claim interpretation. Second, the 
Federal Circuit must eliminate the broadest reasonable interpretation 
standard as applied to the reexamination of previously litigated 
patents. Finally, Article III courts must deny requests for litigation 
stays for the purpose of reexamination proceedings. 
B.  Effect of Proposal on Reexamination of a Previously or 
Concurrently Litigated Patent 
If my proposed changes are adopted, an alleged infringer 
unsatisfied with the results of a Markman hearing could still file a 
reexamination request. However, a request for a litigation stay for the 
purpose of the reexamination would be denied. As such the litigation 
proceeding would continue until the district court enters its decision 
regarding infringement, and the claim construction determined 
during the Markman hearing would be binding on the PTO under the 
principle of ―law of the case.‖103 Finally, following a Federal Circuit 
appellate decision—and perhaps even a Supreme Court decision—
the claim construction would be considered final and therefore 
binding on the PTO under the doctrine of issue preclusion. 
V.  JUSTIFICATION FOR EXTENDING ISSUE PRECLUSION TO  
ARTICLE III COURTS‘ CLAIM INTERPRETATION AS  
DETERMINED BY A MARKMAN HEARING 
A.  Similarity Between Issue Preclusion and Other Preclusive 
Doctrines Currently Applied in Patent Practice 
Extending issue preclusion to a Markman hearing‘s claim 
construction is consistent with other preclusive doctrines applied in 
patent practice. This includes Article III courts‘ treatment of a 
 
include the PTO such that the Due Process Clause and the procedural protections afforded to the 
government are not implicated. A complete analysis of this issue is outside the scope of this Note. 
 103. 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 566 (2007) (―The doctrine of the law of the case 
generally prohibits reconsideration of issues which have been decided by the same court, or a 
higher court, in a prior appeal in the same case. Provided that there was a hearing on the merits 
and that there have been no material changes in the facts since the prior appeal, such issues may 
not be relitigated in the trial court or reexamined in a second appeal. In short, issues decided in 
earlier appellate stages of the same litigation should not be reopened, except by a higher court, 
absent some significant change in circumstances.‖). 
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patent‘s prosecution history regarding disclaimers,104 a disclaimer‘s 
effect on a subsequent reissue patent,105 an amendment‘s effect on a 
patentee‘s use of the doctrine of equivalents,106 and Article III courts‘ 
rejection of inconsistent claim interpretation when arguing patent 
validity and infringement.107 
A patent owner in litigation may not argue for a claim 
interpretation covering subject matter that was previously disclaimed 
as indicated in the patent‘s prosecution history.108 ―[T]he prosecution 
history limits the interpretation of claim terms so as to exclude any 
interpretation that was disclaimed during prosecution.‖109 By doing 
so, the prosecution history places the public on notice of what the 
terms of the patent mean. A patent‘s litigation history would serve 
the same function if the claim construction determined during a 
Markman hearing were binding on the PTO in a subsequent and 
concurrent reexamination proceeding. 
Similarly, the Federal Circuit held that a reissue110 application 
filed more than two years after the grant of the original patent is 
bound by the remaining patent claims after a disclaimer111 is filed.112 
 
 104. Rheox Inc. v. Entact Inc., 276 F.3d 1319, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 105. Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 106. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002). Under the 
doctrine of equivalents a patentee may demonstrate infringement despite a lack of literal 
infringement—where the accused device falls within the textual scope of the patent claim—by 
demonstrating that that the differences between the accused device and claimed invention are 
insubstantial. Lee Petherbridge, On the Development of Patent Law, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 893, 
920 (2010). 
 107. See Lemley, supra note 46, at 110. 
 108. Rheox, 276 F.3d at 1327. 
 109. Id. (quoting Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 
1995)). 
 110. SCHWARTZ, supra note 20, at 34 (―Section 251, 35 U.S.C., provides that a patent may be 
reissued by the PTO, upon surrender of the original patent, if the patent is ‗through error without 
any deceptive intention, deemed wholly or partly inoperative or invalid.‘ . . . Claims may be 
broadened in a reissue application if the application is filed within two years of issuance of the 
patent. . . . After two years, a reissue application may be made only to narrow claims or to leave 
their scope unchanged. . . . A reissue application must claim the same general invention as the 
original patent and cannot be used to recapture subject matter initially given up in order to 
convince the examiner to grant the original patent.‖).  
 111. Id. at 32–33 (―A patent owner may disclaim or dedicate to the public the entire term of 
an entire patent (all claims of a patent), the entire term of any complete claim (but not only part of 
a claim), or the terminal part of the term (that portion of the term beyond a certain date) of the 
entire patent (but not the terminal part of the term of only some of the claims of a patent).‖ 
(footnote omitted)). 
 112. Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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Essentially, if a party disclaimed a patent claim, it ―effectively 
eliminated those claims from the original patent.‖113 In coming to its 
decision in Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp.,114 the Federal Circuit 
referred to the public‘s reliance interest in the scope of claims.115 This 
same rationale extends to the public‘s reliance on claim construction 
as determined during a Markman hearing. In the same way that 
public policy is promoted through the public‘s ability to look only to 
non-disclaimed claims in the original patent to determine the patent‘s 
scope, public policy is also promoted through the public‘s ability to 
look at a patent‘s litigation history to determine the meaning of the 
patent‘s claims. 
Further, there is a rebuttable presumption that a patentee 
surrenders equivalents between an original claim and an amended 
claim through a form of prosecution history estoppel if an 
amendment is aimed at satisfying the patentability requirements.116 
The presumption is overcome if the patentee demonstrates that ―at 
the time of the amendment one skilled in the art could not reasonably 
be expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally 
encompassed the alleged equivalent.‖117 
Finally, extending the doctrine of issue preclusion to claim 
construction is consistent with Article III courts‘ rejection of 
inconsistent claim interpretation when arguing patent validity and 
infringement. Patent law dictates that claims are to be construed 
consistently.118 As such, Article III courts have rejected patent 
owners‘ and accused infringers‘ attempts to construct claims 
differently for the purposes of determining validity and 
infringement.119 One basis for denying a patent owner the ability to 
argue a broad claim meaning in determining infringement and a 
 
 113. Id. at 1383. 
 114. 162 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  
 115. ―The public is entitled to rely upon the public record of a patent in determining the scope 
the scope of the patent‘s claims. This reliance enables businesses, as well as others, to plan their 
future conduct in as certain an environment as possible.‖ Id. at 1384 (citations omitted). 
 116. Petherbridge, supra note 106, at 924 (citing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo 
Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 741 (2002)). 
 117. Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 741. 
 118. Lemley, supra note 46, at 110. 
 119. Id. 
  
Winter 2011] PREVENTING INEQUITY 769 
narrow claim meaning in determining validity120—or vice versa in the 
case of an alleged infringer121—is that consistent claim construction 
better serves competitors‘ and the entire public‘s reliance interest in 
determining patents‘ scope and validity.122 Preventing inconsistent 
claim construction by the PTO and Article III courts during 
prosecution, reexamination, and litigation certainly better promotes 
the public‘s reliance interest than the current regime. 
Consistency in claim construction through issue preclusion is 
consistent with the general policy of promoting public reliance on the 
scope of patent claims. Thus, the term ―party‖ should be expanded to 
include the PTO, the broadest reasonable interpretation standard 
during reexamination of previously litigated patents should be 
abandoned, and requests for litigation stays for the purpose of 
reexamination should be denied such that issue preclusion may 
apply. 
B.  Why Issue Preclusion Is Preferable  
to Chevron123 Deference 
Eliminating the broadest reasonable interpretation standard 
during reexamination of previously litigated patents would result in 
consistent claim construction within the PTO and Article III courts. 
This raises the question of why Article III courts should not defer to 
the PTO‘s interpretation pursuant to deference under Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.124 (Chevron). 
The Chevron framework was recently applied in a case where 
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) decided that 
―telecommunications services‖ within the Communications Act did 
 
 120. Id. (―Patent owners would like their patent claims to be construed broadly in 
infringement proceedings, so that they cover defendants‘ products, but would generally like their 
claims to be construed narrowly when it comes to validity, to avoid the risk of either treading on 
the prior art or claiming more than the patentee has enabled or described.‖). 
 121. Accused infringers prefer that patent claims be construed narrowly in the case of 
infringement so that the patent does not cover their product and construed broadly in the case of 
determining validity, increasing the likelihood that the legal requirements of patentability are not 
satisfied. Id. 
 122. Id. at 113. 
 123. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 124. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). ―Chevron deference‖ dictates that where an agency has interpreted 
a statute prior to litigation, the courts shall defer to the agency‘s interpretation if Congress has not 
spoken directly to the question at issue and the agency‘s interpretation is not ―arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.‖ Id. at 843–44. 
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not include broadband internet,125 despite a prior judicial decision to 
the contrary.126 The Court upheld the agency‘s interpretation on the 
basis that a prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency 
construction that would otherwise be entitled to deference ―only if 
the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the 
unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency 
discretion.‖127 
In claim construction, where the terms of the claim are almost 
always ambiguous, it appears that National Cable & 
Telecommunications Ass‟n v. Brand X Internet Services128 and 
Chevron would require that subsequent PTO claim construction 
during a reexamination proceeding trump a prior judicial decision 
regarding claim construction. However, the relationship between the 
PTO and Article III courts, especially the Federal Circuit, can be 
distinguished from the standard relationship between agencies and 
courts in many respects, which leads to the conclusion that deference 
to the PTO regarding claim construction is inappropriate. 
In the case of the FCC, Congress has delegated the power to 
―execute and enforce‖ and to ―‗prescribe such rules and regulations 
as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the provisions‘ 
of the Act,‖129 thus giving the FCC power to promulgate ―binding 
legal rules.‖130 Conversely, Congress has not delegated substantive 
rule-making authority to the PTO.131 Given the PTO‘s lack of 
substantive rule-making authority, ―Chevron does not apply.‖132 
In addition, limitations regarding the PTO‘s access to prior art 
and the ex parte nature of reexamination further illuminate that 
deference is inappropriate. First, the PTO‘s claim construction is 
largely the product of incomplete information. While agencies are 
generally ―better equipped‖ than courts,133 this is not the case in 
 
 125. Nat‘l Cable & Telecomm. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 974 (2005). 
 126. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 127. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. at 982. 
 128. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).  
 129. Id. at 980 (citation omitted). 
 130. Id. at 981. 
 131. Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Animal Legal Def. 
Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. at 980 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984)). 
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regards to claim construction and the PTO. Courts recognize prior art 
as a valuable claim-construction tool,134 as it ―gives clues as to what 
the claims do not cover‖135 and may ―demonstrate how a disputed 
term is used by those skilled in the art.‖136 As such, the PTO‘s limited 
access to prior art, due to cost and time limitations, results in claim 
constructions based on incomplete information.137 This issue is 
exaggerated further in reexamination proceedings where the prior art 
that may be considered is limited to patents and printed 
publications.138 
Second, PTO claim construction is largely ex parte in nature.139 
As interested third parties are largely prevented from partaking in 
claim construction during reexamination proceedings, it is 
inappropriate to grant deference to the PTO‘s claim constructions 
resulting from such proceedings.140 
In contrast, during patent litigation, ―lawyers and technical 
experts will spend hundreds and perhaps even thousands of hours 
searching for and reading prior art.‖141 Also, prior art in litigation is 
not limited in scope to patents and printed publications.142 Greater 
access to prior art gives the judge greater guidance in claim 
construction during a Markman hearing.143 In addition, patent 
litigation is adversarial in nature, thus granting interested third 
parties the opportunity to partake in claim construction.144 
It is inappropriate to give deference to the PTO‘s claim 
interpretation given the PTO‘s lack of access to prior art based on 
cost and time limitations, the narrow scope of prior art that the PTO 
may consider during a reexamination proceeding, and the limited 
opportunity of interested third parties to be involved in claim 
 
 134. Thomas Chen, Patent Claim Construction: An Appeal for Chevron Deference, 94 VA. L. 
REV. 1165, 1189 (2008). 
 135. Id. (quoting Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967)). 
 136. Id. (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
 137. See id. at 1190. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1502 
(2001). 
 142. Chen, supra note 134, at 1190. 
 143. See id. 
 144. Id. 
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construction during reexamination.145 As such, extending issue 
preclusion to claim construction determined during a Markman 
hearing is the preferable method for mandating consistent claim 
interpretation within the PTO and Article III courts—at least in the 
limited context of reexamination of previously litigated patents. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The current dichotomy approach to claim interpretation results 
in inequity as a patent applicant must argue patentability of a broad 
claim within the PTO while, as a patentee, the applicant may only be 
able to enforce a narrow claim through litigation. On the other hand, 
an alleged infringer is given two opportunities to invalidate the 
infringed patent; an infringer dissatisfied with the results of a 
Markman hearing may still file a reexamination request where claim 
construction will be dictated by the PTO‘s broadest reasonable 
interpretation standard. This horizontal inequity can be eliminated by 
applying issue preclusion to the claim construction determined 
during a Markman hearing such that the Article III court‘s 
determination of claim meaning has a preclusive effect over 
concurrent and subsequent PTO reexamination of previously 
litigated patents—by extending the term ―party‖ to include the PTO, 
eliminating the broadest reasonable interpretation standard during 
reexaminations of previously litigated patents, and denying requests 
for litigation stays for the purpose of reexamination. Further, 
extending issue preclusion to claim construction during 
reexamination of previously litigated patents will better serve the 
public by providing a patent litigation history that conclusively states 
what the terms of the patent mean, thus clarifying what the ―patented 
invention‖ is. 
 
 
 145. Id. 
